Germany is one of few countries in which the monetary compensation for inventors is not only determined by negotiations between employer and employee inventor, but also by relatively precise legal provisions.. In this paper, we discuss the characteristics of the German Employees' Invention Act (GEIA) and discuss which incentives or disincentives it creates. We rely on qualitative evidence from expert interviews as well as responses from a recent survey of 3,350 German inventors. We can conclude from our data that the GEIA creates substantial monetary rewards for productive inventors. However, the qualitative responses from our survey also point to a number of dysfunctional effects.
1 Introduction
In 2001, the EU15 countries invested a total of €175.5 billion in research and development activities. Approximately two thirds of this amount were R&D expenditures mady by business enterprises, the remainder shared by publicly financed research institutions and academia. Almost 70 percent of these investments are expenditures for R&D personnel. Yet, it is surprising how little attention is given to the transformational process behind these numbers. Clearly, the development of ideas and new concepts is financed by the financial means just summarized. But the actual work is done by inventors, either in corporate labs, in publicly financed research institutions or in academic research, and their motivation and inventives should matter greatly for Europe's chances of becoming more successful in global technology markets.
While the innovation literature in the early 50s and 60s contributed a large number of insights on invention processes, much of the subsequent work in this field turned away from the individual inventors to consider the overall design of processes and organization.
1 This paper does not follow this trend, but seeks to return to a topic that is probably a highly neglected one in contemporary innovation studies -the motivation and performance of individual inventors. Using a novel dataset with rich information on the context of invention processes, on the value of inventions and on the biography and mobility of inventors, we describe a rather unique institutional setting in which the compensation of inventors is determined by law. The backdrop of our study is the German Inventor Compensation law, once hailed as progress towards giving inventors a fair share in the benefits that they create in creative worknowadays criticized as heavy-handed government intervention in processes public adminstrators should better not meddle in.
There are few processes that go unregulated in Germany. The compensation for employee inventors is one of the processes which many countries have left to be negotiated between the parties involved, the inventors and the corporations. Only very few countries have embedded rules and provisions in the civil code or forms of legal provisions. There has been a longstanding debate in Germany (but also in other countries) whether such regulation really creates proper incentives for ingenuity and inventions. Some authors have pointed out that the regulation may actually be counterproductive in that it induces strategic behavior among inventors and firms which may be harmful to innovation inventives.
Since much of the potential behavior cannot be observed easily, we use inventor responses from a large-scale survey to explore some of these issues. We find that inventor compensation in Germany allocates some returns to inventors -in a few cases exceeding gross salaries by a factor of two and more. But in most cases, the compensation appears quite moderate from the inventor's perspective. In our survey data, we measure the inventor's compensation as the compensation received for a particular patent (or all patents to which the inventor contributed) divided by the gross salary without inventor compensation. The extent to which inventors profit from their inventions can be shown to depend most strongly on the invention's value and quality. Second, the number of inventors has a very plausible impact which appears to be largely in accordance with the legal provisions. Variables associated with the inventor's rank 3 in the organization also impact significantly on the compensation share variable, and again consistent with the legal provisions. While inventor producitivity (the average annual number of inventions made over the inventor's active career) contributes positively to patent value, it has a negative coefficient in our compensation regressions. Similarly, educational attainment is negatively associated with the compensation share variable. These results presumably reflect the legal rule that individuals higher up in the organization will profit less from a service invention -simply since contributing to such inventions is part of their normal job for which they are compensated by relatively high salaries. Taken these and other results together, it appears that the mechanism is basically meritocratic in nature.
Our survey responses also yield qualitative insights into the functioning of the compensation schemes. Most inventors (59.5 percent) view the legal regulation positively, largely because of its financial effect in their favor. Others emphasize the fact that the risk and cost are born by the employer. Among the 28.3 percent who view the compensation rules largely negative, two opinions are dominant -that the compensation is not large enough, and that the compensation scheme lacks transparency. A criticism frequently encountered in the literature concerns the tendency that superiors appear among the inventors although they have not contributed to the invention. Inventors may accommodate such requests (or even suggest an inclusion of other decision-makers) in order to maximize the chance of having an invention being protected by patents. We do not find much evidence of such strategic behavior -only 1.8 percent of the respondents mention it. While these results support a cautious positive assessment of the German Employees' Invention Act, we hasten to add that we cannot compare the compensation rules to a setting in which bonuses would be negotiated bilaterally between employer and employee inventor. Our study remains an exploratory one in that respect.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the history and provisions of the German Employees' Invention Act. We also summarize the results from previous studies that have analyzed this nexus. In section 3, we discuss our research questions in more detail and specify the hypotheses to be tested later. Section 4 presents the data and discusses the key variables that we have devised for the multivariate analysis. In section 5, we present some descriptive evidence bearing on our main question, while the multivariate results are presented in section 6. The final section provides a brief discussion of our results and concludes.
Invention Processes and the German Employees' Invention Act

Salient Features of Invention Processes
To assess the efficacy of institutionalized incentives for inventors, it is helpful to consider the salient features of invention processes first. We do not attempt to draw a real-life picture of such processes here, but a basic understanding of their features is important to understand the basic incentive problems. We make three observations on inventions and patents: first, productivity among inventors appears to be very heterogeneous in the sense that few inventors produce the lion's share of inventions within an R&D department; second, the value of individual patent rights follows a very skew distribution which can be approximated quite well using a log-normal distribution function; third, inventions are often made by or within teams. Thus, the dynamics of R&D teams is highly relevant for our study. We discuss these points in turn.
The productivity of inventors is quite heterogeneously distributed. An early study of this issue was undertaken by Lotka (1926) . Lotka analyzed the publication output of scientists. His research resulted in the following equation, often refered to as Lotka's Law -the number of scientists producing exactly n papers is proportional to 1/n 2 . Hence, when 100 scientists publish exactly one paper per time period, it would be a share of 1/2 2 , i.e. 25 who would produce two papers in that time period, about 11 (1/3
2 ) with three publications, and so on. One may argue that such differences in productivity may merely be a function of experience (and age). Allison/Steward (1974) undertook a study to distinguish between time-invariant effects associated with the individual inventor, and experience effects due to the cumulative advantage of scientists. Cumulative advantage means that scientists become more productive during their professional life. As a measure of productivity, the authors use the number of citations received by scientific articles of US scientists in university departments. Results show that both, pre-existing differences and cumulative advantage affect differences in scientists' productivity. Note that output is measured using the quantity of output, not its quality. But as it turns out, the relatively good performance in terms of publication numbers is not achieved by trading quantity off against quality. Ernst et al. (2000) finally conducted a survey on inventors of 43 German firms and show that highly productive inventors are frequently responsible for the most valuable patents. Narin/Breitzman (1995) extended Lotka's findings on patented inventions in the semiconductor industry. As a result, they find that output is even more concentrated than Lotka's Law suggests.
A multitude of attempts have been made to measure patent value on behalf of value indicators drawn from patent documents available in patent databases of national or regional patent offices. Indicators used are e.g., the number of citations received (Trajtenberg 1990 , Harhoff et al. 1999 , Lanjouw/Schankerman 1999 , the number of claims (Lanjouw/Schankerman 1999 and , the incidence of an opposition or litigation (Lanjouw/Schankerman 1999 , Harhoff/Reizig 2001 , Harhoff/Hall 2003 , or patent renewal data (Pakes 1986 , Schankerman/Pakes 1986 , Lanjouw et al. 1998 . Results of most of these approaches have one thing in common: they provide evidence for a highly skewed distribution of patent value (i.e. Harhoff et al. 1999 , Scherer et al. 2000 . Scherer et al., (2000) show that the top decile of German patents in 1977 accounted for 88% of the total value. Giummo (2003) analyzes the time profile of returns to patented inventions, as well as its cumulative value. Information on patent value was gained from compensation records of German inventors of six major German companies. Calculation of the amount of compensation according to licensing analogy, seizable company's benefit, or estimation demands valuation of the surveyed invention. Therefore, compensation records are considered as an appropriate proxy for patent value. Giummo confirms previous findings concerning skewness of the distribution of patent value.
The third characteristic of modern invention processes is team production. In our data, only 24 percent of the inventions covered by our survey were made by individual employee inventors. Inventor teams consist on average of 2.49 inventors. Incentive systems need to take this characteristic into account by coming up with a sharing rule for the inventor 5 compensation. While the negotiations between co-inventors can be acrimonious, even more complex cases arise in the context of sequential inventions. Suppose that team A has made a basic invention upon which the inventions of several other inventor teams are based. If subsequent inventions replace the original one in the marketplace, the earlier inventors may see their compensation erode because too little emphasis is given to the pioneering nature of their contribution. In our survey responses, some of these conflicts will turn out to be important.
Institutionalized Compensation Schemes in Other Countries
In Germany, the rights and liabilities within an employer-employee-inventor relationship are governed by a specific legal institution. Comparable legal regulations only exist in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. We briefly consider a few features of these systems before turning to the German institutions.
The Swedish Employees' Invention Act is of dispositive nature, i.e., the legal provisions may be amended by the employer or the employee as long as the employee's basic right to compensation is not affected. Basically, the Swedish Employees' Invention Act distinguishes between two types of employee inventions: the work-related invention and the invention arising outside the context of employment. The rights on work-related inventions are fully transferred to the employer. For the second type, the rights to the invention remain with the employee. However, the employee must offer the employer the right to use the invention. In principle, the employee can apply for a patent before reporting the invention to the employer.
The Danish Employees' Invention Act is quite similar to the Swedish Law. Basically, the right to the invention remains with the employee-inventor. The inventor is obliged to report all inventions to the employer. For inventions, which were made during the employee's normal work duties, the employer can claim the right to the invention. The claiming of the right has to be declared no later than four months from receipt of the report. Disagreements are brought before a board of arbitration. The inventor's claim to a reasonable compensation is deemed to be satisfied within his regular salary (Rebel 1993 ).
In the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and Japan, regulations concerning employee-invention form a part of the national patent law. According to the English Patents Act (Art. 39-43), inventions which were made during the employee's normal work duties or within the scope of extraordinary duties specially assigned to the employee, and also inventions that were reasonable to be expected within the duties of the employee belong to the employer. The remaining inventions belong to the inventor himself. Compensation is to be paid only if the employer profits exceedingly by the patented invention. The burden of proof of an "exceeding profit" rests with the employer. Disputes concerning the compensation are submitted to court or are decided by the controller within the firm (Leptien 1996 , Reitzle et al. 2000 .
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The French Patent Law also assigns inventions which are made in fulfillment of an 6 employment contract to the employer. A compensation for the employee-inventor has to be regulated by agreements of tariff or by contractual agreements. Disputes concerning compensation have to be fixed by an Arbitration Commission or in court (Reitzle et al. 2000) .
The Italian legal regulations only differ from the French ones in terms of granting of a compensation. If no special arrangements have been made, the inventor has a right to a reasonable compensation, depending on the economic value of the invention. The amount payable to the inventor decreases with the degree of involvement of the employer in the creation of the invention (Rebel 1993 ).
In Austria, employees explicitly referred to as "Inventors" are excluded from receiving an inventor compensation or only receive a limited payment. Inventors are considered to be sufficiently paid for inventive efforts by their regular monthly salary. Special agreements on granting a compensation are possible. The amount of remuneration depends on the economic value of the invention (Rebel 1993) .
Almost the same regulations are applied in the Netherlands. An inventor obtains an additional compensation, if and only if he has not already been sufficiently remunerated by his regular salary. The amount of compensation is again measured by the economic value of the invention, which is determined by the employer (Rebel 1993 ).
The Japanese Patent Act basically assigns the right to the invention to the employee ( § 35 Japanese Patent Act). The employer receives the right to a non-exclusive license and is not obligated to pay compensation. Assignment of an employee-invention to the employer may be regulated in advance by contract or employment negotiations. In this case, the right to the invention is passed to the employer or the employer receives an exclusive license. The employee is then entitled to receive a reasonable remuneration on the part of the employer.
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In Switzerland and Liechtenstein employee-inventions are an element of civil law. According to Art 332 Obligation Law (Obligationenrecht), patentable and not patentable inventions, made during the employee's normal work duties, are to be reported to the employer. Rights to the invention are assigned to the employer. Payment of compensation is compulsory. The amount of payment depends on the economic value of the service invention, the duties and position of the employee in the firm, on the contribution made by the employer and by third parties to, and finally on to what extent internal equipment had been used for making the invention. Disputes have to be solved by Labor Court (Rebel (1993) .
In the United States 4 and in Canada, there exist no special legal provisions at all. Basically, the inventor principle is applied, which means that the invention belongs to the inventor. Therefore, patents are always applied for in the inventor's name, and then assigned to the employer. Conditions concerning an assignment of the invention to the employer are to be regulated by contractual agreements. Contracts of employment in the US therefore, typically contain the following duties: First of all, the employee-inventor has to notify the employer of each invention made. Secondly, the employee-inventor has to keep secret any invention or company related affairs, respectively and last but not least, the inventor has to confer all rights to the invention to the employer during the employer-employee relationship (Leptien 1996) .
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The employee-inventor in return has no legal claim to compensation. Compensation may also be determined in the employment contract. In cases, where no contractual agreements exist between the employer and the employee-inventor, and the employer was instrumental in making the invention, the employer receives a "shop right". Due to this shop right, the employer obtains a non-exclusive license. In exchange, the employer pays a license-fee of 1 US$ representing a symbolic inventor compensation (Leptien 1996) .
The Provisions of the German Employees' Invention Act
The first German Patent Law came into force in 1877. Given the limited number of employeeinventors at the end of the 19 th century, there was little need for specific legal regulation concerning employee inventors. The increase in the number of employee inventors at the beginning of the 20 th century led to an increasing demand for legislation (Kurz 1997 6 . This regulation formed the basis for the legislation efforts after the Second World War. In the aftermath of the war, the social partners were keen to reestablish the patent system as soon as possible and therefore, were ready to agree to another compromise. The draft law, becoming the first government bill (Regierungsentwurf) in 1952, was prepared by the Federal Ministry of Justice (Bundesjustizministerium) and also by the German Association for Intellectual Property Rights and Copyright Protection (Deutsche Vereinigung für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht). The government bill proposed a board of arbitration at the German Patent Office. In 1955 a second government bill was brought forward. The second proposal excluded technical improvement proposals; restricted claiming of inventions became possible, and the provisions on inventions of university professors and scientific assistants 7 were added. By means of this proposal passing of the law became possible.
In 1957 the German Employees' Invention Act became effective. The need for a universally valid German law arose because of a conflict between the German Employment Law and the Patent Law. According to the German Employment Law, the results of the work of an employee belong to the employer, whereas the Patent Law assigns the property of an invention to the inventor himself. The Employees' Invention Act resulted in a social balance 8 between employer and employee, where the rights to the patent are transferred to the employer. In return the employer must pay the employee-inventor a reasonable compensation. Additionally, the law was supposed to provide incentives for inventive output (Leptien 1996) .
In its current form, the German Employees' Invention Act applies to all inventions which are eligible for a patent or a utility model as well as to technical improvement proposals made by employees in enterprises which are governed under German law or made by employees in German subsidiaries of international enterprises (Giummo 2003) . It provides a set of rules concerning rights and liabilities of both the employer and the employee.
The Act distinguishes between service inventions and free inventions. Service inventions are inventions with either result from the obligatory activity of the employee in the company or "(…) are substantially based on experience or activities of the company" ( § 4 ArbnErfG 8 ). Other inventions, e.g. inventions made by employees during leisure time or by self-employed inventors, are free inventions. According to § 5 ArbnErfG the employee is obligated to report a service invention to the employer immediately.
9 Within the period of four months from the receipt of the report of the invention, the employer can claim the invention on a restricted or unrestricted basis ( § 6 ArbnErfG). If the employer does not claim the invention the legal title to the invention is released to the inventor. In case of an unrestricted claim, all rights to the invention are transfered to the employer, and the employer is obliged to file a national patent application for the invention. A restricted claim provides the employer with a non-exclusive right to use the invention, which implies that the employer is not allowed to grant licenses on the patented invention (Reitzle et al. 2000) . Restricted claims turn out be quite infrequent -in our data, only yy percent of all patents are claimed by the employer on a restricted basis. In the case of a restricted claim, the employer has no obligation to file a German patent application.
Once the invention is claimed, either in restricted or unrestricted form, the employer has the obligation to reasonably compensate the inventor. The inventor's right to remuneration arises as soon as the employer has claimed the right to the service invention (unrestricted claiming of right) or as soon as the employer has claimed the right to the invention and uses it (restricted claiming of right). Guidelines for the Remuneration of Employees' Inventions in Private Employment 10 were first issued by the Federal Minister for Labor and Social Affairs (Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung) in 1959. They regulate in some detail how the compensation is determined. The compensation is supposed to be proprotional to the value of the invention. According to section 1 of the guidelines, three different methods exist for calculating the value of the invention:
• by using a licensing analogy, i.e. by determining the license fee that would have to be paid for the use of a comparable counterfactual invention owned by a third party, Office as well as the courts check appropriateness of compensation by means of these guidelines (Leptien 1996) .
• by calculating the benefits from the invention accruing to the employer, i.e. the difference between costs and revenue resulting from the use of the invention, or • estimation of the value of the invention, i.e. by determining the price which would have had to be paid by the company to buy the invention from a free inventor.
The estimation of the value of the invention provides the basis for the calculation of the compensation payable to the inventor. In a second step, the share of value accruing to the inventor(s) is determined. According to § 9 (2) ArbnErfG, the proportion attributable to the inventor(s) depends on: the economic exploitability of the service invention, the duties and position of the employee in the company, and also on the degree of involvement of the company in the creation of the service invention.
If more than one employee-inventor is responsible for a service invention, the relative contributions of the inventors have to be specified. §12 (2) ArbnErfG specifies that the compensation must be determined for each inventor separately. Each inventor has to be informed about the total amount of remuneration and the share received by the other coinventors.
Disputes arising between employers and employer regarding the inventors' compensation can be brought before the Board of Arbitration at the German Patent and Trademark Office in Munich or Berlin ( § § 28-36 ArbnErfG). The Arbitration Board issues a proposal for a settlement. This proposal is binding for both parties unless a written opposition is filed within one month. After an opposition has been filed, the proceedings before the Arbitration Board are deemed to have been unsuccessful and the filing of an action with the court having jurisdiction (the respective district court) is possible. On an average, less than 100 disputes per year are negotiated before the Arbitration Board (GPTO 2003) . Compared to the annual number of patent applications coming under the German Employees' Invention Act 11 , this number seems to be relatively small.
Problems caused by the German Employees' Invention Act
Since its inception in 1957, the German Employees' Invention Act has apparently posed several problems. Within the last 20 years a number of economic and legal studies have analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of the law and the associated institutions. The act aimed at creating a social balance between employer and employee, as well as providing incentives for inventive activities. Several theoretical and empirical analyses have examined to what extent this original objective of the Employees' Invention Act has been attained. In the following sections, we summarize some results from this literature.
The Employees' Invention Act enhances the degree of legal certainty for employee inventors. Due to the law, inventors are entitled to receive compensation in exchange for the assignment of the rights to the invention. Rights remaining with the employer seem to make sense, since the employer has made specific investments (e.g. costs for the patent application) to exploit the employee's invention. To ensure employment, firms have to balance risks by holding a patent portfolio. Successful inventions can compensate for losses (Merges 1999) . Apart from spreading the risk, employee-inventors would not be able to afford costs associated with patent applications.
Both Giummo (2003) and Manly (1978) find that the number of conflicts brought before the Arbitration Board at the German Patent and Trademark Office is relatively small when compared to the overall number of patents for which such a conflict could in principle arise.
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But they differ in their interpretation of this indicator. Manly (1976) interprets the limited amount of disputes as a sign of an effective operation of legal regulations in Germany. Conversely, Giummo (2003) argues that inventor employees are unlikely to jeopardize their careers by initiating a legal conflict with their employer. In his interpretation, the low number of conflicts is not informative about the actual effectiveness of the legal provisions governing inventor compensation.
Delayed payments are generally thought to provide relatively weak incentives for inventive effort. A study of 10 major inventions conducted by Globe at el. (1973) shows that inventions are brought to market several years after the date of patent application. The results of this study show that the shortest time lag from invention to commercialization and therefore to payment of the remuneration amounts to 6 years. Brockhoff (1997) argues that large firms frequently are organized in terms of profit centers and therefore are keen to delay payment. Additionally, exorbitant administration efforts impede annual payment. As a rule, compensation is paid in two-or three-year intervals (Brockhoff 1997) .
Another disadvantage cited affects the actual calculation of the remuneration. The German Employees' Invention Act does neither provide clear provisions concerning the calculation of the compensation nor does it define a standard for reasonable remuneration ( §9 (1) ArbnErfG). Furthermore, in many cases there is a choice among potential reference quantities (e.g., sales or production quantity) which can conceivably influence the amount of compensation considerably (Gaul 1988) .
Another problem, according to Staudt et al. (1992) and Heimbach (1992) , arises in the context of joint inventions. Enforcement to inform each inventor on the total amount of remuneration and the shares that each co-inventor contributes makes compensation traceable. Nevertheless, attribution of performance is difficult. Furthermore, an increase in the number of co-inventors reduces compensation for every single inventor. The motivation within a research team may suffer from controversies. Manly (1978) criticizes that legal regulations "single out one cog in the innovative wheel -the inventor". The author especially argues that today's R&D processes are characterized by coactions of interdisciplinary teams of specialists from different divisions within the firm. The German Employees' Invention Act in contrast is only applicable for employee-inventors.
According to § 20 (1) ArbnErfG compensation has to be paid only for technical improvement proposals which grant the employer an advantage similar to that of a patentable invention. For elementary technical improvement proposals, compensation is voluntary. One would therefore assume that this provision results in treating reported improvement proposals as not important and trivial. Disregard of inventive activities also decreases the motivation of inventors. Leptien (1996) surveyed 116 inventors of German firms active in the electrical engineering, mechanical engineering and chemical industries. One of the major findings is that part of the inventors is inadequately informed about the regulations of the Employees' Invention Act. Staudt et al. (1992) conducted a survey of 522 employee-inventors. Respondents were drawn by random sample from a list of all national German patents published in 1987. The results confirm that employee inventors have only partial knowledge of their rights as employee inventors. Even more interestingly, the results show that 27.9% of the questioned inventors complain about superiors being mentioned in invention reports because of their hierarchical position, but not due to their contribution to the invention. The phenomenon of executives being included as co-inventors without having made a contribution to the invention is also reported by Brockhoff (1997) and Schmeisser (1986) . Kersten (1996) e.g. argues that compensation is calculated as proportion of turnovers. Therefore, radical innovations (which initially generate very low reveneues) are disadvantaged in comparison to incremental innovations or modifications of existing technology. To counteract such effects, Kersten proposes to limit compensation to the actual increase in sales due to the invention.
The analysis of Will and Kirstein (2002) draws on the principal-agent theory, combining elements of moral hazard and hold-up. The authors assume that the German Employees' Invention Act should create two incentives: employee-inventors are supposed to spend effort on R&D activities, employers are supposed to commercialize or exploit the invention, respectively. To create an efficient payment scheme Will/Kirstein analyze two scenarios which differ with respect to timing and mode of payment.
Two players, the employee-inventor (E) and the firm (F) are considered by Will/Kirstein. Both parties are assumed to be rational and risk-neutral maximizers of expected profits. First of all, E decides about his effort to spend into an R&D project, which increases the probability of a successful invention. If the project is not successful, the game ends. If the invention is successfully made, F decides whether to claim the right to the invention or not. In the latter case the game ends. If F claims the right to the invention, he chooses his effort to exploit the invention. The output generated by E displays the probability of success of the invention, whereas the output generated by F increases the value of the invention. Two institutional settings are distinguished: exogenously fixed payment and negotiation over payment after the project turned out to be successful. Furthermore, marginal payment is tested against lump-sum payment. In both settings the optimal marginal payment to E leading to an optimal inventive effort amounts to zero. The optimal allocation should give F the residual claim to the project value (value less costs). This motivates F to invest an efficient effort in the exploitation of the invention and leads to a maximum cooperation rent. F should receive a fixed amount of payment that equals the net value of the cooperation rent. Neither a variable payment, nor ex-post negotiations lead to efficient efforts on the part of the employee and the employer. The results show that ex ante determined lump-sum payment turns out to be an efficient incentive system for employee-inventors as well as the employer.
Finally, the analysis of Merges (1999) responds to the widely-held criticism that employer ownership of employee-inventions dampens incentives to invent. Merges himself is in complete agreement with the US legal regulations. In the US, conditions concerning a possible assignment of the invention to the employer as well as the compensation are to be regulated by contractual agreements. Besides internal reward systems, the US law contains a "quietly effective escape hatch" (Merges 1999 ) allowing the inventor to exit a firm before an inventive concept has taken on a concrete tangible form. One would assume that quitting the firm on the part of a productive inventor poses a threat to the employer and increases bargaining power of an inventor. To support his thesis, Merges considers four arguments derived from economic theories. First of all, a strategic bargaining analysis strictly negates assigning the right to an invention to the inventor due to investments made by the employer within the R&D project. Secondly, the difficulties of monitoring and compensating the members of inventor teams are discussed within the team production theory. Thirdly, the principal agent theory especially addresses the danger that employee ownership to the invention would over-reward inventive tasks at the expenses of other job requirements, especially, if employees are assigned to multiple tasks within a firm. Finally, the commonsense analysis addresses an inefficient change in risk allocation between employer and employee. Therefore, assigning the right to the invention to the employer by contractual agreement seems to be the only efficient allocation of ownership.
Given the controversy surrounding inventor compensation in general and the German institutions in particular, it is not surprising that some observers have called for the abolition of the law. For example, Brockhoff (1997) proposes to replace the collective legal regulation with an individual incentive system for employee-inventors, where compensation is a result of negotiations between inventor and employee.
Research questions and hypotheses
While a number of studies have looked at particular features of the German Employees' Invention Act, little representative large-sample evidence has been produced. The most reliable information on the amounts paid out to inventors come from Giummo's (2003) study. But his figures are not representative, since they reflect inventor compensation in a few large corporations. The questions that we address in this study are the following:
• Does the GEIA create substantial rewards?
• Which types of inventors profit the most from the GEIA?
• How does compensation differ across industries, technical fields, etc.?
• Do inventors consider the law important in providing suitable incentives?
• Do inventors point to significant disincentives created by the law?
To answer these questions, we collected data on the inventor compensation (measured as the share of gross salaries before bonus payments) associated with a particular patent and a number of characteristics of the patent and the associated invention process. Moreover, we have some data on inventor biographies from the same survey so that we can look at the 13 relationships between these variables.
Given that the GEIA regulates compensation relatively precisely, our hypotheses for the empirical tests are easily derived:
H1. Inventor compensation should increase with the value of the patent right.
H2. Inventor compensation should decrease with the number of co-inventors.
H3. Inventor compensation should decrease with the inventor's rank in the organization.
H4. Inventor compensation does not vary across industries.
H5. Inventor compensation does not vary with firm size.
The first three hypotheses reflect largely the regulatory components of the GEIA. The latter two state that other variables which we would expect to be determinants of compensationabsent a legal institution -do not have explanatory power if we have included patent value, number of inventors and variables describing the rank of the inventor in the regression analysis.
4 Data Source and Sample
Data Source -the German Inventor Survey
Data underlying this survey was collected within the scope of a European project sponsored by the European Commission. The project named PatVal (The Value of European Patents: Empirical Models and Policy Implications Based on a Survey of European Inventors) started in January 2002. The main objective of the PatVal project is to create a database of patent characteristics obtained from a survey of European inventors, who are named in EPO patents, and from information drawn from the patent documents. To achieve planned results, six research groups from six European universities joined this project. In each of the six countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands) domestic inventors were asked simultaneously about their granted EP patents as well as the invention process leading to the specific patent. This survey only relies on the German dataset. Therefore, units of observation are inventors who lived in Germany at the time of application of the respective patent. 10,500 EP patents containing inventors living in Germany were chosen by a stratified random sample from a list of all granted EP patents with priority date between 1993 and 1997 (15,595 EP patents). A stratified random sample was used in order to oversample potential important patents. To do this, the sample contains all patents an opposition had been filed against by a third party (1,048) as well as the top decile of the patents in respect to citations received (5,333). Out of the remaining patents (9,212) a random sample of 4,119 patents was drawn. Within this sample, 118 inventors moved to another country in the meantime and 857 are multiple 14 inventors, which means they filled out at least two questionnaires. The remaining 8,357 inventors live in Germany and are responsible for one patented invention in the dataset.
To obtain the wanted information, the inventors were provided with a questionnaire. As addressee we chose the first inventor listed on the patent document. In case verification of the inventor's address had not been possible the second inventor was chosen. Thus, we proceeded as long as an address definitely turned out to be correct or a new address could be assigned to the inventor. In case the invention had been made by a single inventor or verification of the addresses had not been possible, we chose the first inventor (the only inventor) mentioned on the patent document. The selected inventors were provided with a letter together with the questionnaire. The letter also contained a link leading to a web questionnaire in order to give the inventors the possibility to choose between the paper-based and the web-questionnaire. To date, we received 3,346 responses, resulting in an unadjusted response rate of 32% and an adjusted response rate of 33%.
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The questionnaire is divided into six sections: Section A contains personal information about the inventors, section B contains information on their educational backgrounds. Section C covers data on employment and mobility of the inventors. Section D is about the invention process (collaborations, important sources of knowledge). Section E contains information on the inventors' rewards as well as the German Employees' Invention Act. This section will be most important for the following analysis. Section F finally deals with the value of the patents.
We merged the data from the questionnaire with bibliographic and procedural information on the respective patents obtained from the online epoline-database provided by the EPO. 
Variables
From the datasets decribed above, we generated a number of variables which are used in our empirical analysis. We briefly describe them here.
• PATSHARE -share of salary received as inventor compensation for the surveyed patent. In the survey, we asked the respondents, which share of their fixed salary they had received in 200x as inventor compensation for the patent in question. We employ a Tobit estimator to relate this variable to the exogenous regressors described below.
14 We tested whether inventors who answered the questionnaire early differ significantly from inventors who answered late. The first 10% of respondents were considered early respondents whereas the last 10% were the late respondents in this analysis. Each of the two groups contained about 300 inventors. The most important dependent and explanatory variables were tested: the value of the surveyed patent, the value of the patent family as well as the strategic value of the patent, additionally, the compensation for the surveyed patent and the compensation for all patents as share of annual income, finally, the inventor's age as well as the number of employees of the applicant. Results show no significant differences (at the 10% level) between the two groups.
• Education -the questionaire asked respondents to indicate their terminal degree. In order to simplify the analysis, we aggregate our education variables to three groups: secondary school or vocational training, vocational academy or university studies, doctoral or postdoctoral studies.
• AGE -the age of the inventor at the time of the survey.
• INVPROD -inventor productivity adjusted for age. We divide the total number of patent applications and inventions kept secret by age minus 25. One way of justifying this measure would be the assumption that inventors become active at age 25 and continued to work with constant productivity. Obviously, this is a stark simplification, but it will serve to generate a first version of an age-corrected productivity figure.
• MAINFIELD -main technical field. This variable aggregates the technical fields to which the inventions belong to six main fields.
• FIRMSIZE -number of employees. We obtained the firm size variable from the questionnaire. We actually use log(number of employees) in our regressions.
• INVENTORS -the number of inventors. The amount of inventor compensation received by any of the inventors depends on the total number of inventors. Since we do not have exact information on the contributions made by the inventors, we use this variable to control for differences between inventions coming from teams of differential size.
• PATVALUE -the monetary value of the patent. A central question in our survey asked respondents to indicate in which value interval their patent would be found. The intervals were less than 30,000€, between 30,000€ and 100,000€, between 100,000€ and 300,000€, between 300,000€ and 1 million €, between 1 and 3 million €, between 3 and 10 million €, and above 10 milleion €. We generate a set of 7 dummy variables from this group and include them (with the exception of the first) in the regressions.
• STRATVALUE -strategic value of the patent. This variable indicates if the patent belongs to a) the top decile of patents in this industry, b) the top quartile, but not the top decile, the top fifty percent by not the top quartile, and the bottom half of the patents in the industry. We maintain three of the four dummy variables in the regressions, but since these are likely to be collinear with the PATVALUE dummies, we use these measures als alternatives, not in conjunction.
• ORIGINALITY and GENERALITY. These measures was first proposed and computed by Trajtenberg et al. (1997) for US patents.
• PCT -a dummy variable indicating that a PCT application had been filed for this patent.
• CITES -citations received within 5 years following the publication of the search report. These measures were obtained from a citation database maintained at the Institute for Innovation Research.
• FAMSIZE -size of patent family. We measure the size of the overall international patent family by computing the number of equivalent patents in existence. This number is obtained from the ESPACE server maintained by the European Patent Office.
• MOBILITY variables -in order to test if mobile inventors (and patents based on inventions made by mobile inventors) differ from suitable control groups. We use dummy variables indicating that the inventor either i) did not change to another employer after having made the invention (reference group), ii) changed employers once, iii) changed employers twice, iv) changed employers more than twice since the date of the invention.
• CITY variables -two dummies indicating if the invention has been made in a city with more than 1 million inhabitants or in a city with between 500,000 and 1 million inhabitants. The reference group are inventions made in rural areas or cities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants.
• INVENTION CONTEXT variables -these variables reflect characteristics of the invention process, in particular, i) if the invention came about as the planned result of an R&D project, ii) whether it was an expected by-product of such an R&D process, iii) whether it was an unexpected by-product, or iv) whether the invention was made during the leisure time of the inventor. The reference group is given by inventions that were the product of a non-R&D process, e.g. inventions made in production or other functions of the firm.
Survey Evidence -Descriptive Statistics
The sample used for the multivariate analysis contains 1,983 patents granted by the EPO. Table 1 presents summary statistics, i.e. mean values and standard errors for the variables described before. The compensation for the surveyed patent (as share of annual income) ranges from 0 to 100 at an average of 1.8. 100% means that inventors double their annual income due to inventor compensation. Payment for all patents of the surveyed inventors ranges from 0 to 500 at an average of 8.3. Over all, 18 inventors receive more than their annual income due to compensation for all of their their patents. The distributions of these variables are depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2 . It is clear from these graphs that inventor compensation has a right-skew distribution -most inventors receive no or very small compensations for their inventions, while few inventors can add substantial sums to their gross salary. The inventors are characterized by a high educational level. On average, 50% of the inventors in the sample have a university degree; another 38% undertook doctoral or postdoctoral studies. At the time of the survey, the inventors were aged between 32 and 76 at an average of 53 years. The inventors' productivity ranges from 0.1 to 32.3 patents per year of inventive activity, with a mean of 1.0. This result confirms previous findings by Lotka (1926) , who found that the productivity of inventors follows a highly skew distribution.
Almost 60% of all patents were assigned to the chemical/pharmaceutical industry and to mechanical engineering. On average, patents held by companies employing 52,278 employees. The number of employees ranges between 1 and 500,000 with a standard deviation amounting to 97,340. The median of the monetary patent value ranging from "< 30,000 Euro" to "more than 10 million Euro" falls in the third category "100,000 to 300,000 Euro". The strategic patent value has its mean at "the patent belongs to the top 50% but not top 25% of the patents within the technological field". The number of citations received within 5 years after publication of the search report ranges from 0 to 13 at an average of 0.5 citations.
Tables 2 to 5 summarize the univariate or bivariate relations between the share of compensation received for the surveyed patent and a number of exogenous variables, i.e., inventors' age and education, firm size and number of inventors, monetary patent value, and strategic patent value. Table 6 tabulates the average values of a number of variables by technical field.
As to inventor age and education, Table 2 suggests that there are almost monotonic relationships between these variables and inventor compensation for the surveyed patent.
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With greater educational attainment, the compensation share is decreasing. Presumably, this reflects the impact of the rank of the individual within the corporation (H3). As age increases, inventors tend to earn a higher share as compensation for the surveyed patent. This may very well reflect selection processes -productive inventors are retained in R&D so that over time, a positive correlation between value of a patent and inventor age emerges. Note that the effect must be strong, since it even compensates the base effect in our dependent variable. As inventors get older, their base salary is presumably increasing due to seniority effects. If this presumption is correct, the inclusion of patent value in our multivariate regressions should render the age variable insignificant. In our value regression, the age variable should have a large positive coefficient. As we will see later, both predictions are actually born out.
A typical finding in labor economics suggests that wages in large firms are higher than those in smaller firms. Since we cannot control for the level of gross wages, there is some ambiguity associated with the tabulation of the compensation share variable. If the compensation share is also a positive function of firm size, we would expect the compensation variable to rise or be constant as firm size increases. The descriptive statistics in Table 3 do not comfirm that view. At best, we find an inversely U-shaped relationship. It seems clear that the compensation shares in larger firms are smaller. However, note that this may reflect differences in the organization of R&D -inventor teams in large firms may very well have more members, thus reducing each inventor's share. In the multivariate regression, we will control for such effects. Should firm size not have a statistically significant impact, then we would conclude that inventor compensation (in absolute terms) is depending on firm size just as gross wages are. The relationship between compensation and the number of inventors is more straight-forward -as the invention team gets larger, the average compensation share for each inventor is reduced. Table 4 displays the bivariate relationship between the monetary value of the patent (as indicated by the inventor) and the inventor's compensation (again for the patent under consideration). The compensation share is (almost) monotonically increasing with patent value. Similarly, in Table 6 we can see clear evidence that the other "relevance variable" -the strategic and economic importance of the patent -has a plausible and statistically significant assocation with inventor compensation. This finding is again in accordance with the Guidelines for Remuneration as well as § 9 (2) ArbnErfG, determining that the economic exploitability of an invention determines the amount of payment. Note that the first group of patents -those ranked among the top 10 percent in strategic and economic importanceaccount for 16.8% percent of the observations. That simply reflects the fact that our stratified sampling approach has led to an oversampling of valuable and strategically important patents. Table 7 summarizes mean values of a number of regressors by technical field. A brief inspection of this table shows that the compensation share is strongly affected by the number of inventors. While patents in chemicals and pharmaceuticals are the most highly cited and account for the largest patent families, the average number of inventors per patent is also relatively large. The average compensation share per patent in chemicals and pharmaceuticals is therefore the lowest of all tecnical fields. Nonetheless, the table also yields the puzzling result that overall compensation shares are the highest in the technical field of consumer goods and civil engineering. This table suggests that there are significant differences in inventor compensation across technical fields. But again, since various variables may have countervailing effects, the technical field impact needs to be considered in the multivariate setting. Before we turn to our multivariate results, we briefly comment on our qualitative survey responses.
To learn more about the motivating or discouraging effect of the German Employees' Invention Act, the inventors were asked to give their opinion concerning the underlying legal regulations. The answers were divided into three groups according to their attitude to the legal regulations. Figure 3 shows that 59.5% of the inventors believe the Employees' Invention Act to be largely motivating, whereas 28.3% assume a negative effect on their motivation. The remainder, a group of 12.2% of the surveyed inventors, do not attach much importance to the legal regulations concerning their inventive performance.
The first group contains 920 inventors, assigning an overall positive effect to the legal regulations. Figure 4 shows frequencies of the incentive drivers mentioned by the inventors in the first group. Financial incentives turn out to be second to none, mentioned by 57.2% of the sub-sample. The advantage of well-defined legal provisions (18.0%) and the acknowledgement of inventive performance (16.6%) range far behind, in the second and third place. Also important for the employee-inventors is the employer's support concerning formalities of the patent application (3.6%) as well as the absorption of costs and risk by the employer (9.3%).
Inventors who regard the German legislation concerning employee inventions as discouraging for the invention process represent the second sub-sample (n 2 = 437). Figure 5 displays that "compensation too small" is the most frequently mentioned disincentive (33.6%). One third of the inventors in the second sub-sample consider compensation as too low, compared to their inventive performance. Almost one third (32.0%) complain about the lack of transparency concerning the determination of an appropriate compensation and about the intense influence capability of the employer on its calculation. 15.3% of the respondents mention delays in the payment of compensation (or even no payment) as non-satisfying.
Due to a decision of the Federal Court of Justice in November 1989
16 , tax benefits for employee-inventor compensations have been cancelled. Therefore, it is not surprising that 6% of the second sub-sample complain about tax regulations. 9% complain about the additional burden of administration necessitated. Also mentioned by the inventors are conflicts with the employer (6%) as well as conflicts between inventors among themselves (6%). The particular problem concerning inventor -employer-conflicts is that inventors do not want to jeopardize their careers by contesting their inventor awards in court or by otherwise turning against their employers. Inventors come into conflicts with colleagues due to enviousness, resulting in an impairment of team work as well as in an inference of communication between colleagues.
Results even show that inventors hinder a sequential or substitutional invention, not deriving from them, in order not to loose the compensation granted for their earlier invention (2%).
Finally, the inventors reported a phenomenon, already observed by Staudt et al. (1992) : the co-inventorship of superiors (1.8%). Superiors are mentioned as a co-inventor, not due to their inventive performance or participation in the inventive process, respectively, but due to their position within the firm. Given the notoriety that this phenomenon has received in the literature, our results suggest that its importance may have been overstated considerably.
Multivariate Analysis
Our multivariate analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we try to determine how our variables are related to the (presumably) most important determinant of inventor compensation -the patent's value. We use the ordinal information from our survey (see Table 4 ) and employ an ordered probit framework for the analysis. Our second step -the analysis of the compensation share variable -also treats the data as ordinal. We observe considerable bunching around particular integer values (0, 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, ...) in our data so that a transformation to an ordinal scale appears appropriate.
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The first part of the analysis confirms earlier results which suggest that the value of patents is highly correlated with a number of indicator variables. We consider the results in column (3) for the overall value specification first. Citations, legal challenges (opposition) and the size of the patent family are (as expected) positively associated with patent value. Somewhat unexpectely, two other R&D process variables turn out to have a significant impact. First, patented inventions that are the planned product of R&D projects are more valuable than unplanned results or mere by-products of R&D. This result may reflect a selection effectfirms will actively try to develop ideas in R&D projects if they expect the project to yield valuable results. On average, that expectation appears to be born out more often than not. This interpretation is strenghtened by another result -the more inventors are involved in the invention, the more valuable it tends to be. Again, choosing relatively large teams is likely to reflect a company's assessement that it should try to achieve the invention quicklypresumably, because it is a valuable invention.
The surprise lies in the second R&D process variable with a positive coefficient -inventions made during the inventor's leisure time are considerable more valuable than other types of inventions. This result may reflect two very different phenomena -first, taking the positive 20 coefficient at face value, it may indeed be the case that leisure time provides the optimal environment for creative break-throughs. On the other hand, the result may involve strategic b behavior on the part of inventors who wish to enhance their contribution to the inventive process. Social desirability may play a big role in generating this result, and we will investigate it in more detail in the future.
A final comment on the value regression concerns the technical field dummy variables. In column (3), they do not contributed jointly any more to the explanation of patent value. This appears to be due to the inclusion of the R&D context variables in column (3).
We now turn to the inventor compensation regressions in columns (4), (5) and (6). Our expectation is that the results should reflect strongly the legal provisions of the German Employees' Invention Act. Indeed, in all specifications, the dominant determinant of compensation is the patent's value. The coefficients of the dummy variables are increasing as the value of the patent increases, and they are highly significant throughout. Moreover, the results are very stable as we include more variables.
The number of inventors has the expected negative coefficient which is again highly significant in all specifications. Interestingly, inventor productivity and educational attainment carry a negative sign. This result is consistent with the view that these variables proxy for the inventor's rank in the organization which should be negatively associated with the level of compensation for service inventions.
Firm size and the technical field to which the invention belongs have no impact whatsoever. Moreover, the value correlates opposition, citations and family size do not have any impact, nor do any of the other variables in that group. Apparently, the inclusion of the value dummy variables leaves little explanatory power for these variables. Similarly, the variables describing the context of the invention have no explanatory power.
The remarkable picture emerging from the compensation regression is that those variables which should have an impact due to the text of the law do indeed have an impact. While that was expected, it seems remarkable that technical field and other variables cannot develop any additional explanatory power. It seems that on average, the GEIA is indeed applied fairly consistently across different industries and technical fields. This statement leaves considerable room for deviations from the average, but it is highly unusual that a set of control variables such as those for the technical field of the invention does not have any statistical role in the regression.
Conclusions
This paper has discussed in some detail differences in national legal provisions dealing with the compensation that inventors are entitled to for their service inventions. Germany assumes an unsual role in this comparison, since inventor compensation is regulated to a level of detail that is not found in other countries. The extent of compensation can be considerable. In our sample, the inventors report that they receive on average about 8 percent of their gross salaries as compensation for service inventions. Our multivariate analysis yiels the surprising result that the law appears to be applied very consistently across different technical fields. We find that the patent's value, the number of inventors and variables associated with the inventor's position in the company have the expected impact. Moreover, by comparing these results to those of a value regression, we can assure ourselves that the lack of explanatory power of other variables is not due to measurement problems. Taken together, there is reason to believe that inventor compensation is largely a meritocratic system.
The qualitative results from our survey confirm that view to some degree. The majority of inventors views the compensation system positively. Yet, there appear to be areas in which an improvement or reform is necessary. We will consider these areas in more detail in subsequent research. Note: In a bivariate ANOVA, the effect of education is highly significant (F = 11.68, p = 0.000), whereas age effects are not significant (F = 0.93, p = 0.423) Note: In a univariate ANOVA, the effect of the strategic patent value is highly significant (F = 13.64, p = 0.000). Relative Importance
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